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Abstract
Several recent studies in experimental economics have tried to measure beliefs of
subjects engaged in strategic games with other subjects. Using data from one such
study (Nyarko-Schotter, 2002) we conduct an experiment where our experienced
subjects observe early rounds of strategy choices from that study and are given
monetary incentives to report forecasts of choices in later rounds. We elicit beliefs using
three diﬀerent scoring rules: linear, logarithmic, and quadratic. There are diﬀerences
between the elicited beliefs under quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules in spite of
both being proper scoring rules. The (improper) linear scoring rule frequently elicits
boundary forecasts as theory predicts, and is poorly calibrated. We compare the
forecasts of our trained observers to forecasts of the actual players in the
Nyarko-Schotter experiment and identify several diﬀerences. There was a significant
positive correlation between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the game
under both proper scoring rules, but no significant correlation between the players’ own
forecasts and the actual play. This raises doubts about whether beliefs can be reliably
elicited from players who simultaneously have a stake in the target of their forecast, in
this case the opponent’s choice. The distribution of player forecasts also tended to be
more extreme than the observer forecasts using either of the proper scoring rules. We
also find evidence of belief convergence when beliefs are elicited iteratively from a group.
Keywords: Scoring rules; Experiment; Game theory; Forecasting; Beliefs
1 Introduction
Probabilistic beliefs play a central role in mathematical theories of strategic decision
making. In games of strategy, optimal decisions depend on beliefs about other players’
choices, which in turn depend on their beliefs about one’s own decision, and so on. Many
ideas lying at the very foundation of these theories and related concepts in economics,
such as rational expectations and Nash equilibrium are built around strong assumptions
about beliefs. Most attempts to test these theories, often in laboratory experiments,
either measure beliefs indirectly by estimation, or impose maintained hypotheses about
beliefs (such as rational expectations), resulting in tests of joint hypotheses about beliefs
and rational choice. The ability to evaluate or test these theories more sharply would be
greatly enhanced if it were possible to measure beliefs directly. Indeed, there has a
number of recent attempts of direct measurement of probabilistic beliefs by
experimental economists, in the context of strategic games. Examples include Dominitz
and Hung (2004), in the context of information cascades, Huck and Weizsacker (2002) in
the context of lottery choice experiments, McKelvey and Page (1990) for information
aggregation, Duwfenberg and Gneezy (2000) in trust games, Oﬀerman et al. (1996) and
Croson (2000) in voluntary contribution games. The results of those papers raise
questions about the measurement methodology itself, and its applicability to the
elicitation of beliefs in a strategic environment. Indeed, a striking finding from several of
these experiments is the surprising prevalence of extreme forecasts (degenerate or nearly
degenerate forecasts), which is hard to reconcile with standard theory.
This paper explores four methodological questions and two substantive questions
about the use of scoring rules for the elicitation of probabilistic beliefs about behavior in
strategic games. We undertake this exploration in the context of a simple 2x2
asymmetric matching pennies game similar to the one originally studied by Ochs (1995)
and more recently by McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (2000), Goeree, Holt, and Palfrey
1
(2003), and Nyarko and Schotter (NS, 2002).
The first question is: can beliefs be reliably elicited from the players of a game,
during the play of the game? Unreliable reported beliefs could arise for a variety of
reasons, including psychological factors such as rationalization, or via distortion of
incentives because they are also being paid according their play in the game, which
violates the "no-stakes" condition of Kadane and Winkler (1988). We address this
question by comparing the elicited beliefs of (experienced) observers to the elicited
beliefs of the players themselves. Our subjects observe real sequences of choice behavior
from the NS data, and are asked to make probabilistic one-move-ahead forecasts of the
play of the game, as the sequence is played back to them in real time, using scoring rules
to incentivize the forecasts. Because the NS subjects also made incentivized
one-move-ahead forecasts, this allows for a direct comparison.
The other three methodological questions address the issue of whether the choice of
the scoring rule makes a diﬀerence: Are forecasts elicited using proper scoring rules
systematically diﬀerent from those elicited using improper scoring rules? Are forecasts
elicited via two diﬀerent proper scoring rules the same or diﬀerent? Are forecasts better
calibrated for some scoring rules than others? With these latter two questions in mind,
we conduct an experiment with three diﬀerent treatments, each corresponding to a
diﬀerent scoring rule. The three scoring rules used are logarithmic (proper), quadratic
(proper), and linear (improper).
The substantive questions both concern information aggregation and belief
convergence of subjective beliefs. First, are individuals in a group able update their
beliefs in response to the forecasts of other members of the group? (belief convergence)
Second, if such convergence occurs, are individual forecasts improved by group
interaction? (information aggregation) To address these questions, our experiment
includes a second feature that allows for information aggregation. Our observers were
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placed in groups of four, and there were two sequential rounds for each forecast. The
entire profile of individual forecasts of group members was revealed between the two
rounds, so each individual had an opportunity to update his or her forecast in response
to the forecasts of the other group members. This allows us to test for belief convergence
(comparing the variance of first round to second round forecasts) and information
aggregation (comparing the accuracy of first round and second round forecasts).
We have five main findings. First, there is a diﬀerence between the elicited beliefs
under quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules in spite of both being proper scoring rules.
Forecasts elicited from our observers using the logarithmic scoring rule are less extreme
(closer to (.5,.5))than forecasts under the quadratic scoring rule according to several
diﬀerent measures. Second, the linear scoring rule produces forecasts closer to 0 and 1
than the proper rules, and these forecasts are poorly calibrated. Third, the forecasts by
our observers with both proper scoring rules were more accurate than the forecasts of
the NS players, in the sense that the average elicited forecast was closer to the true
choice frequencies in the data. Furthermore, there was a significant positive correlation
between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the game under proper scoring
rules, while there was no significant correlation between the NS players’ forecasts and
the actual play. This reinforces doubts about whether beliefs can be reliably elicited
from players who simultaneously have a stake in the target of their forecast, in this case
his opponent’s choice. Fourth, the distribution of forecasts by NS players were more
extreme than the observer forecasts using either of the proper scoring rules. Fifth, we
find evidence for belief convergence among our observers.
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1.1 Related Literature
1.1.1 Scoring rules
Scoring rules, which yield payoﬀs as a function of vector of probabilistic forecasts and a
realized event, are used to elicit subjective probabilities in laboratory and real-life
settings. Diﬀerent scoring rules have diﬀerent incentive compatibility properties.
Because elicitation methods are used to uncover "true" probabilistic beliefs, incentive
compatibility is an important criterion for the "goodness" of any scoring rule. A scoring
rule is classified as proper if it is incentive compatible. In the scoring rule literature, a
scoring rule is considered incentive compatible if a forecaster cannot attain a higher
expected score by reporting a probability diﬀerent than her true probability.
Brier (1950) and Good (1952) were the first to identify two such proper scoring
rules, quadratic and logarithmic, respectively. Since then, both the quadratic and
logarithmic scoring rules as well as others have been shown to be strictly proper. Savage
(1971) specifies the general rule for generating the class of strictly proper scoring rules
and there have been numerous theoretical studies of desirable and undesirable properties
of proper and improper scoring rules.
1.1.2 Previous experiments using scoring rules to elicit beliefs
The quadratic scoring rule is the most common one applied in both laboratory and field
experimental settings for the forecasting of subjective events such as weather forecasting
(Staël von Holstein 1971), stock market prices (Staël von Holstein 1972), outcomes of
sporting competitions (Winkler 1971), and game theory (see below). The logarithmic
scoring rule has been applied to a much lesser extent in experiments on education
testing (Hambleton et. al. 1970; Glein and Wallace 1974) and information aggregation
(Ledyard et. al. 2005).
A few articles in the psychology literature have studied belief elicitation with
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diﬀerent scoring rules, but none has conducted a comprehensive comparison of
elicitations from the logarithmic, quadratic, and linear scoring rules, none have looked at
the use of scoring rules for belief elicitation in the context of strategic choices in games,
and none have compared player and observer forecasts.
Studies in experimental economics that have tried to use of scoring rules to elicit
subjective beliefs about action choices in a strategic game have produced mixed results.
In the context of two-person matrix games, extreme reported beliefs are observed with
surprising frequency (Dominitz and Hung 2004, Nyarko and Schotter 2002). Because the
"true" frequencies of target states is generally between .35 and .65 in these studies, this
suggests bias in the forecasts. Furthermore, beliefs are erratic, in the sense that they
change much faster from period to period than a Bayesian model would predict,
indicating that forecasts are not only inaccurate, but highly imprecise (Nyarko and
Schotter 2002, fig. 2, p. 980). If the players were adjusting beliefs according to Bayes
rule or even according to a simple counting procedure, truthful reporting of beliefs
should have a smoother trajectory than the observed forecasts. There is also evidence
from two person laboratory games that the process by which subjects decide on a
forecast is qualitatively diﬀerent from the decision process they use to make a decision,
which can sometimes result in forecasts that are inconsistent with choice behavior
(Costa-Gomes and Weizsacker 2006).
In contrast, Dominitz and Hung (2004), in the context of an information cascade
experiment, report that players’ forecasts are dampened relative to Bayesian reports. In
particular, they find that subjects often fail to change their forecasts in response to hard
information, which suggests possible distortions in the elicitation procedure. The task
was diﬀerent from the our task of one-step-ahead forecasts of choices in a repeated game,
since their subjects were repeatedly forecasting a static target (the state of the world),
rather than a stochastically moving target. Oﬀerman et al. (1996) elicited subjective
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player forecasts about the level of contributions of other players in a voluntary
contributions game. Some of the forecasts were degenerate, bimodal, or implausible for
other reasons, and they confirm the finding reported by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1991)
that subject beliefs about others’ contributions exhibit an optimism bias.
There is very little evidence about the similarities and diﬀerences between forecasts
elicited from observers and forecasts elicited from players themselves, and what evidence
exists is mixed. Huck and Weizsacker (2002) elicit forecasts from subjects who observe
decision makers in a simple (objective) binary lottery choice task. They find some
inaccuracies, notably that the forecasts are closer to 50/50 than the actual choice
frequencies of the subjects, and that this doesn’t depend in a significant way on the
elicitation procedure. This is in stark contrast to the forecasting behavior measured
using an identical quadratic scoring rule in the NS experiment, where reported beliefs of
players are biased in the opposite direction. These two findings are also at odds with
findings reported in Oﬀerman et al. (1996, p. 828), where observers submitted forecasts
that were more extreme than those submitted by the players themselves.
1.1.3 Convergence of beliefs
Our iterative elicitation method could induce a common knowledge inference process
whereby individual beliefs adjust after others’ beliefs are revealed. In the common
knowledge literature, Aumann (1976) first established that if two agents have the same
common prior, their posterior probability of an event must be the same if the posteriors
are common knowledge. The subsequent work of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
(1982), McKelvey and Page (1986), and Nielsen et al. (1990) are more closely related to
the possible process generated by our iterative elicitation method. Geanakoplos and
Polemarchakis show that with iterated exchange of information between the agents, the
inference process would terminate at a point where the posterior probabilities are equal.
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Related to our iterative elicitation method are experiments in which subjects receive
feedback about other subjects’ forecasts (McKelvey and Page 1990; Oﬀerman and
Sonnemans 1998; Winkler 1968). With the exception of Winkler’s experiment in which
he elicits forecasts about subjects with intrinsic uncertainty such as the weather or
sports through an unincentivized questionnaire, the rest induced diﬀerences in private
information in the laboratory and focused upon the eﬃciency of private information
pooling when there is objective uncertainty. These studies report some belief
convergence as measured by the reported forecasts of these objective events.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 Simple Matrix Game
This is the simple matrix game that was used in the Nyarko-Schotter experiment and in
ours as well.
Green Red
Green 6, 2 3, 5
Red 3, 5 5, 3
Table 1. Matrix game payoﬀs.
This is a constant sum game with an unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies
that is supported by the principle of best response. In equilibrium both players choose
Green with 40% probability and Red with 60% probability.
2.2 Three Scoring Rules
Scoring rules, which compute a numerical score as a function of the stated probabilities
as well as the realized event, are often used in forecasting and experimental settings to
assess the accuracy of forecasts. In our experiment, this score also specifies the monetary
payoﬀ. A scoring rule is proper if the forecaster maximizes her expected monetary
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payoﬀ by revealing her true belief. We next describe the three scoring rules used in the
three belief elicitation treatments of our experiment. We then go on to show that the
quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules are proper whilst the linear scoring rule is not.
2.2.1 Preliminaries
Let i = 1 , 2 , ..., n denote the n possible events and let p = (p1, p2, ..., pn) be the
forecaster’s stated forecast, where pi is the stated probability of event i. Define the
scoring rule S = {S1, S2, ..., Sn} as a collection of scoring functions where Si(p) specifies
the score when event i is realized as a function of the forecast, p. Let π = (π1, π2, ..., πn)
be the subject’s true belief where πi is the probability of event i.
2.2.2 Characterization
1. Quadratic Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = α− β
nX
k=1
(Ik − pk)2 (1)
where α, β > 0 and Ik is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if the realized
event is event k and 0 otherwise. The quadratic rule scores the inaccuracy of the
forecast as a constant minus the sum of the square deviations. In our belief
elicitation experiment, there two possible events the observer is forecasting: the
event that the player being observed chooses Green, which we denote as G, or
Red, R. We denote the two forecasts by pG and pR, respectively, where
pG + pR = 1. Following Nyarko-Schotter (2002), we pay our subjects in the
quadratic treatment an amount in dollars that is proportional to their score, using
parameters α = 1 and β = 0.5. The score is therefore:
SG = 1− p2R if G is chosen
SR = 1− p2G if R is chosen
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It is a straightforward exercise to prove that the quadratic rule is proper: i.e., a
forecaster with true beliefs π maximizes expected score (expected payoﬀ) by
reporting p = π.
2. Logarithmic Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = α+ β(logpi) (2)
where α, β > 0
The logarithmic rule, which is also proper, equals a constant less a penalty
proportional to the natural log of the forecast of the realized event (a negative
number since 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1). The lower the forecast of the realized event, the greater
is the penalty. The score is −∞, however, when zero probability is placed on the
realized event. Because of this property, implementation in practice requires
bounding the forecasts away from zero. We place bounds on the maximum (0.9)
and minimum (0.1) probability a subject can place on any event. We set α = 1
and β = 0.45. The score if event i occurs in the logarithmic treatment is:
Si(p) = 1 + 0.45(logpi)
3. Linear Scoring Rule:
Si(p) = α+ βpi (3)
where β > 0
We use α = 0 and β = 1 in our experiment, so the linear score is simply the
probability forecast for the realized event. The linear scoring rule is not proper. A
forecaster with true beliefs π maximizes expected linear score by placing maximum
weight on the most likely event. If the forecaster believes the two events are
equally likely, then any forecast is optimal.
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3 Experimental design and procedures
We conducted six sessions with a total of 48 subjects. Subjects were registered students
at Princeton University, and were recruited by E-mail solicitation. Sessions were
conducted at the Princeton Laboratory for Experimental Social Science, and all
interaction was computerized. Each subject participated in exactly one session, with 8
subjects per session. The primary treatment variable was the scoring rule, either log,
quadratic, or linear, with one third of the subjects in each treatment.
Each session had two parts. Instructions were read aloud to the subjects.1 In the
first part, subjects were randomly assigned to be either the row player or the column
player in the 2x2 game in Table 1. Keeping the pairings fixed, they played the game
repeatedly for 5 rounds. After round 5, they are assigned to the opposite role so that if
they were a row player in the first five rounds, they are now a column player and vice
versa. They are also randomly repaired with a diﬀerent player and play the game
repeatedly for 5 rounds with this new opponent. Their earnings for Part 1 was the sum
of their earnings over all 10 rounds of play. The sole purpose of part 1 of the session was
to give subjects experience with the game.
In part 2, subjects did not play the game, but instead made "observer" forecasts
about the sequence of choices of either the row or the column player in seven diﬀerent
pairs from the Nyarko-Schotter (NS) experiment. In each session, four subjects (row
forecasters) were assigned the task of sequentially forecasting choices of NS row players
and the other four subjects (column forecasters) were assigned the task of forecasting
the choices of NS column players. These roles were fixed throughout part 2. The scoring
rule (quadratic, log, or linear) was fixed throughout the session, and was explained
carefully to the subjects.
We then played back the data sequentially to the subjects in the following way.
1A sample copy of the instructions is available http://www.hss.caltech.edu/~trp/elicit/sample_instructions.pdf.
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First, for one particular NS pair, all eight observers are told the actions chosen by the
two players of a particular NS pair in the first five rounds of that match. The list of
actions chosen by that NS pair in the first five matches is displayed on every subject’s
computer screen. Each row forecaster is then asked to report a forecast about the
likelihood the row player in that pair chose red or green in round six, and column
forecasters are asked to report a forecast about the likelihood the column player in that
pair chose red or green in round six. This is implemented by requiring each subject to
type in two integers, one for green and one for red, where the two numbers must add up
to 100.2 All the column predictors simultaneously and independently make forecasts in
this manner about the actions of the one column player in round 6 of that NS pair, and
all the row forecasters simultaneously and independently make forecasts in this manner
about the actions of the one row player of the same NS pair.
After reporting these forecasts, all row forecasters are told the forecasts of all the
other row forecasters, and all column forecasters are told the forecasts of all the other
column forecasters. We then elicit a second forecast from each subject by the same
method. This second forecast can be the same or diﬀerent from the first forecast.
After the revised forecasts have been made, the actual choices by the row and
column players in round 6 of that NS pair are then reported back to the subjects, so
they now know the choices by both subjects in the first six rounds of the match. For
each subject, one of their two forecasts was randomly chosen for actual dollar payoﬀ.
Subjects then proceed to make forecasts about round 7 of that NS pair, in the same
manner as they made forecasts about round 6. Roles (row or column forecaster) stay
fixed. They continue in this way to make iterative forecasts for the play in rounds 8, 9,
and 10 of that NS pair, receiving feedback after each forecast. This procedure was then
2Because the log scoring rule gives negative payoﬀs at the boundary (0 or 100), forecasts for that scoring
rule were constrained to be betweeen 10 and 90. For consistency, the same constraint was imposed with
the other scoring rules.
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repeated (sequentially) during the session so that the eight subjects observed a total of 7
NS pairs. Thus, overall, subjects reported and revised forecasts sequentially for a total
of 35 plays of the game by 7 diﬀerent pairs. They were paid the sum of their dollar
payoﬀs in all 35 rounds. Total earnings ranged from $17 to $35.
4 Results
We analyze the results in two subsections. First, we describe the main aggregate
features of the initial elicitation data, before subjects have had the chance to revise their
forecasts in light of the forecasts of others. We compare the distribution of forecasts
across treatments and across roles. We also compare our data with the distribution of
forecasts elicited from NS subjects in rounds 6-10 of that experiment and to the
aggregate frequency of choices observed in their data.
Second, we analyze the accuracy of the forecasts. We use two benchmarks:
uninformed forecasting (always forecasting 50/50) and rational expectations (forecasting
the empirical average frequency in every round). We refer to 50/50 forecasts as
uninformed because such a report is optimal for a forecaster whose prior is uniform on
[0,1].
Third, we investigate questions about the iterative elicitation process. Does it lead
to convergence of beliefs? Does the iterative process lead to more accurate forecasts?
4.1 Individual forecasts: Comparison of scoring rules and
comparison with NS
Table 2 compares the average forecasts and the actual choice frequencies, broken down
by scoring rule and by role (row or column).3 In this and subsequent tables, "column"
refers to column moves or forecasts about column moves. "Row" refers to row moves or
3The analysis in this section considers only the first elicited forecast of subjects. These beliefs are made
before they know the forecasts of the other members of their group. We analyze the revised forecasts in
the next section, where we address questions of convergence of beliefs and information aggregation.
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forecasts about row moves. The first three columns give the average forecast under our
three scoring rule treatments. The fourth column is the average forecast in rounds 6-10
of NS experiment 1 (i.e. the same rounds our subjects were forecasting), and the final
column gives the actual choice frequencies in those rounds.
Three results are illustrated by this table. First, the NS players and our own
subjects systematically underestimate the probability column will choose green and
overestimate the probability that row will choose green, but these diﬀerences are not
significant. Second, this bias is less in both observer treatments with a proper scoring
rule, and for both player roles, compared to the NS elicitation from the actual players.4
Third, for observers, the bias is less with the proper scoring rules than with the linear
scoring rule.
Quad Log Lin NS Quad Observed
Column 45.7∗ 47.7∗ 39.8 44.3 55.7
Row 48.8∗ 47.4∗ 51.7∗ 53.0 42.9
N 560 560 560 140 140
Table 2. Average forecasts compared to observed choices. Entries are % Green.
* = less biased than NS forecasts.
Another way to compare the forecasts of our observer subjects with the forecasts of
the actual players of the game is to look at raw correlations between the two. The first
row of Table 3 reports these raw correlations using the average first round forecasts of
each of our groups of four subjects, matched with the forecasts of the corresponding NS
subject. We find large positive correlations for our quadratic scoring rule treatment, less
4Because the observer forecasts were limited to the range of 10 and 90 and the NS forecasts were not,
we were concerned that theses and other results comparing observer forecasts with NS forecasts might
be an artifact of this truncation. As a check, we have replicated the analysis of NS forecasts in Table 2
by recoding forecasts that are more extreme than 10 and 90, as 10 and 90, respectively. The results are
the same. A similar replication was done for Tables 4 and 5 as well.
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so for the linear rule, and actually negative for the log rule. To test for significance of
these diﬀerences, we ran a Tobit regression of the mean of our elicited beliefs under
quadratic treatment on the corresponding NS elicitations. The coeﬃcients and standard
errors are reported in the second row of Table 3. The coeﬃcient is significant at the 5%
level only for the quadratic treatment. We cannot reject the hypothesis that our log and
linear elicitations are uncorrelated with the elicited beliefs of the NS players.
Quad Log Linear
Correlation 0.17 −0.0081 0.072
Tobit Coeﬃcient 0.087∗(0.043) −0.0022(0.023) 0.037(0.043)
Table 3. Correlation between average Observer forecasts and matched NS forecasts.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗ = significant at p=.05.
The results from Tables 2 and 3 show that the three scoring rules we use with
observers clearly do lead to diﬀerent measurements of beliefs.5 To explore this further,
we examine the diﬀerences in extremeness of elicited beliefs across our three measures
and look at how these dispersions compare with the NS elicitations. To measure
extremeness, we compute the absolute diﬀerences from 50 for each individual forecast.
According to the theoretical results, we know that quadratic and log are both proper
scoring rules, so we hypothesize no significant diﬀerence between the dispersion in
forecasts for log and quadratic. In contrast, the linear scoring rule is not proper; indeed,
optimizing risk neutral subjects will report beliefs equal to either 0 or 1. We hypothesize
the linear elicitation procedure will result in greater dispersion than the quad or log
methods.
In addition, if the distribution of beliefs are the same for observers and players of
the game, and if there are no distortions created by having a subject report forecasts
5As is standard, we maintain a "belief independence" hypothesis throughout. That is, the scoring rule
may aﬀect forecasts, but do not directly aﬀect beliefs.
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and choose actions at the same time (as in NS), then there should be no diﬀerence
between the player forecasts and the observer forecasts, at least under the quadratic
scoring rule. Thus, we hypothesize that there will be no diﬀerences in dispersion
between NS forecasts and the observer forecasts using quadratic rule.
The average extremeness across all forecasts in each treatment is reported in Table
4, with the complete CDF of the diﬀerences displayed in Figure 1.
and Settings/Palfrey/My
Documents/PAPERS/wang-elicit/paper/inddispersioncdf.jpg
Figure 1. Individual forecast dispersions under the three scoring rules and NS.
The diﬀerences are striking. First, the NS player forecasts and linear forecasts
exhibit more dispersion than the forecasts by observers with proper scoring rules. The
diﬀerences are not only significant, but large in magnitude, with the NS dispersions
more than double the log scoring rule dispersion and 35% greater than the dispersion of
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observer quadratic elicited beliefs.
Second, the linear scoring rule leads to the greatest dispersion among the observers,
with the comparison to log and quadratic significant as theory predicted.6 Third, the
linear forecasts are less dispersed than the NS forecasts. Fourth, observer forecasts using
quadratic and log scoring rules are significantly diﬀerent from each other, with the
dispersion under the quadratic scoring rule 60% more than under the log scoring rule.
Quad Log Linear NS
Extremeness 16.42∗(0.64) 10.17∗(0.40) 19.38∗(0.71) 22.19(1.12)
Table 4. Forecast extremeness: average absolute diﬀerence from 50.
Standard error in parenthesis.∗ = significantly diﬀerent from NS (p=.05)
Two other features of the distribution of extremeness are worth noting. The first is
stochastic dominance. The distribution of extremeness for the NS player forecasts
stochastically dominates the corresponding distributions for both proper scoring rules.
Comparing the two proper scoring rules, the distribution of the quadratic rule
stochastically dominates the logarithmic rule, except for an insignificant diﬀerence at 0.
And both proper scoring rules are stochastically dominated by the improper rule (again
with an insignificant diﬀerence at 0). The only comparison that does not show
stochastic dominance is between the observer forecasts with a linear rule and the NS
player forecasts. The second feature about the distributions of interest is the frequency
of boundary forecasts (i.e., forecasts of 10% or 90%). The NS and linear elicitation
procedures resulted in the most boundary forecasts (25.7% and 33.2%), with the proper
scoring rules having significantly fewer (19.6% for quadratic and 2.5% for logarithmic).
6This is consistent with Nelson and Bressler (1989) who found that a linear scoring rule generated
more extreme forecasts than a quadratic scoring rule.
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4.1.1 Accuracy of reported beliefs: Do the subjects know anything?
In the actual NS experiment, and also in our experiment using trained observers, the
subjects clearly think they know something. Over 92% of the time, they report
"informed" beliefs, i.e., forecasts diﬀerent from 50/50. In contrast, observers report
uninformed beliefs relatively frequently: between 1/4 and 1/3 of the time, depending on
the scoring rule.
It is then natural to ask whether the apparently greater confidence of the players is
justified. The evidence suggests it is not. We document this in detail below, but the
bottom line is apparent from Table 2 in the previous section that shows NS forecasts of
row and column actions to be systematically biased and on the wrong side of 50/50.
Moreover, because the choice behavior aggregate frequencies hover around 50% green,
extreme forecasts seem to be harder to defend as "rational", compared with fully hedged
forecasts.
In contrast, we find evidence that the trained observers with proper scoring rules
seem to have some forecasting ability. First we look at the raw correlation between
forecasts and the choices they are forecasting. These are given in the first row of Table
5. The overall correlations between forecasts and actions is significantly positive for
both observer treatments with proper scoring rules. In contrast, we cannot reject the
hypothesis that overall NS forecasts and actions are completely uncorrelated.
Quad Log Linear NS
Correlation 0.135∗ 0.085∗ −0.085∗ 0.022
Calibration regression coeﬃcient 0.30∗ (0.09) 0.31∗ (0.15) −0.17∗ (0.06) 0.034 (0.15)
Calibration regression constant 34.88+(4.94) 34.50+(7.64) 56.96(4.35) 47.64(8.40)
Table 5. Correlation between individual elicited forecast and actual choice in the experiment.
∗Coeﬃcient significantly diﬀerent from 0 (p=.05). Standard errors in parenthesis.
+=constant term significantly diﬀerent from 50 (p = .05)
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Second, we ask how well calibrated the forecasters are (Seidenfeld 1985). By
Seidenfeld’s definition, "a set of probabilistic predictions are calibrated if p percent of all
predictions reported at probability p are true." A subject is perfectly calibrated in our
experiment if for all the instances when she forecasted Green being played with 30%
probability, Green is played 30% of the time, for all the time when she forecasted Green
being played with 60% probability, Green is played 60% of the time, and so on. Table 6
shows the frequency of Green green choice for each forecast (pooled into bins 0-10,
11-20, etc.), with the number of observations in parenthesis. It is clear from Table 6 that
the NS forecasts and the ones under the linear scoring rule are badly calibrated.
Forecast Bin Quadratic Logarithmic Linear NS
0-10 36.1(71) 30.0(10) 53.1(113) 50.0(16)
11-20 42.9(28) 35.7(14) 48(25) 41.7(12)
21-30 44.9(49) 46.0(50) 45.5(22) 45.5(22)
31-40 41.2(51) 47.2(125) 57.1(77) 55.6(18)
41-50 52.4(189) 47.9(192) 48.3(174) 46.2(13)
51-60 53.6(56) 56.3(103) 61.8(34) 47.1(17)
61-70 51.3(39) 48.9(47) 38.1(21) 50(14)
71-80 71.1(38) 86.7(15) 47.4(19) 71.4(7)
81-89 (0) (0) 50(2) 0(1)
90-100 51.3(39) 0(4) 37.0(73) 50(20)
Table 6. Calibration: Observed Percent Green Choice by Forecast.
In order to make statements about the statistical significance of calibration, we ran
Calibration regressions of the action taken (100 for Green, 0 for Red) on the (first
round) forecasts of Green being played. The coeﬃcient on the action choice would be 1
and the intercept 0 if the subjects are perfectly calibrated. The coeﬃcient would be 0
and the intercept 50 if the subjects are forecasts are perfectly uninformed. As reported
in the second and third rows of Table 5, we find that the coeﬃcients are significantly
greater than 0 and the intercept is significantly less than 50 for the observer treatments
with proper scoring rules. In contrast, the coeﬃcients are not significantly greater than
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0, and the constant terms are not significantly less than 50 for either the NS players or
the observers using an improper scoring rule.
4.2 Learning from others’ forecasts
Our experiment had two key design features that allow us to look at questions of
information aggregation. First, for each action decision to be forecast, we elicited
forecasts from four trained observers, rather than just one. Second, there were two
rounds of forecasts, and each forecaster was advised of the forecasts by the other
forecasters before reporting a second round forecast. In this section, we address two
specific questions about the eﬀects of group feedback on forecasts and how the answers
depend on the scoring rule.
1. Do subjects update their forecasts after learning others’ forecasts? (belief
convergence)
2. Are updated forecasts more accurate? (information aggregation)
4.2.1 Belief Convergence
To address question 1, we first compute the frequency that subjects change their
forecast in the second round after being told the other forecasters’ reports, and the
average revision. The findings are reported in Table 7. The answer is yes, forecasters
revise their reports in response to the reports of other forecasters. The frequency of
revision ranges approximately 1/3 to 1/2, and the average absolute change is
significantly positive for all three scoring rules.
Quad Log Linear
Frequency 0.37 0.57 0.32
Average change 6.18∗(0.53) 5.72∗(0.33) 8.73∗(0.80)
Table 7. Frequency of and average revisions. ∗ = significantly diﬀerent from 0 (p=.05)
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As further evidence, we look at the change in the variance of forecasts in the group,
defined as the variance of second stage forecast minus variance of first stage forecast. If
the forecasts are closer together in the second round (negative change in variance), we
take that to be evidence of belief convergence. The first three rows of Table 8 display
the percent of times the change was negative, zero, or positive, by scoring rule. We find
that the within-group variance declines from the first round to the second round about
half the time for all three scoring rule treatments, and declines more frequently than it
increases. The last row of Table 8 gives the average change in variance for each scoring
rule. For all scoring rules, the average change is significantly negative (at 5% level).
Quad Log Linear
% Less Variance 51 49 44
% No Change 24 4 29
%More Variance 24 48 28
Average change −64.30∗ −13.69∗ −35.57∗
Table 8. Directional change in Variance. ∗ = significantly diﬀerent from 0 (p=.05)
4.2.2 Information Aggregation
To address question 2, we look at the diﬀerence between the mean squared deviation
(MSD) of initial forecasts and actions versus revised forecasts and action. The first three
rows of Table 9 display the percent of times the change (revised minus initial) was
positive, zero, or negatively, respectively, by scoring rule. We find that revised forecasts
are more accurate by this measure than initial forecasts, but the diﬀerences are not
large. The last row of Table 9 shows the average change in mean square deviation of
forecasts from action (revised minus initial). The changes are negative in all cases, but
the magnitudes are small.
Quad Log Linear
%More Accurate 19 31 18
% No Change 63 43 68
% Less Accurate 18 26 15
Average change −0.0040 −0.0012 −0.0012
Table 9. Directional change in MSD.
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5 Conclusions
The experiment reported here produced several findings on the elicitation of beliefs with
scoring rules. First, the forecasts by our observers under both proper scoring rules were
less biased than the forecasts of the NS players, in the sense that the average elicited
forecast was closer to the true choice frequencies (Table 2). Second, there was a
significant positive correlation between observer forecasts and the choice behavior in the
game for both proper scoring rules, while there was no significant correlation between
the players’ forecasts and the actual play being forecasted; and the correlation was
actually negative for the improper scoring rule (Table 5). Third, the distribution of
forecasts by NS players were more extreme than the observer forecasts using either of
the proper scoring rules. The average NS player forecast deviations (diﬀerences from
50/50) were not significantly diﬀerent from forecasts elicited from observers under the
linear scoring rule. Fourth, the linear scoring rule elicits that are significantly more
extreme than the two proper rules. Fifth, there is a significant diﬀerence between the
elicited beliefs under quadratic and logarithmic scoring rules in spite of both being
proper scoring rules. Forecasts elicited by the logarithmic scoring rule have significantly
less dispersion. Sixth, forecasts elicited under the proper scoring rules were significantly
more accurate and better calibrated than those elicited from players and from observers
using an improper scoring rule. We did not observe diﬀerences in accuracy or
calibration for the two proper scoring rules. The relative accuracy of the two varied
across our diﬀerent accuracy measures. Seventh, we find significant evidence for belief
convergence but only marginal evidence for information aggregation.
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these findings. We summarize our
findings in terms of the answers they give to the four methodological questions and two
substantive questions posed in the introduction of the paper.
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1. Can beliefs be reliably elicited from the players of a game, during the play of the
game? The first two findings described above raise serious doubts about the
reliability of beliefs elicited from players who simultaneously have a stake both in
the accuracy of their forecast and in the outcome itself, in this case an opponent’s
choice in a two person game. The third finding suggests what one might call an
overconfidence bias in player-forecasts, relative to the forecasts of experienced
observers. A deeper exploration into the sources of this bias is an interesting topic
for future research. A possible explanation is rationalization: players report
forecasts that reinforce their choice.
2. Are forecasts elicited using proper scoring rules systematically diﬀerent from those
elicited by improper scoring rules? Yes, as implied by the sixth finding listed
above. Both proper scoring rules elicit forecasts from our observers that are
significantly more accurate and better calibrated than those elicited under the
linear scoring rule. One source of the bias caused by linear forecasts is that it
elicits more extreme forecasts, as predicted by standard theory.
3. Do diﬀerent proper scoring rules elicit similar forecasts? Yes. The main diﬀerence
between forecasts elicited under logarithmic and quadratic scoring rules was that
the quadratic rule elicited more extreme beliefs than the logarithmic rule. The
distribution of extremeness of forecasts under the quadratic rule stochastically
dominates the distribution under the logarithmic rule. It is interesting that this
did not result in either one eliciting more accurate or better calibrated forecasts on
average than the other. Why we observe this diﬀerence is an open question. The
procedures used were identical, except for the scoring rule, and it seems
implausible that the diﬀerence is due to subject heterogeneity and sampling
variation. Risk aversion is not a plausible explanation either. While risk aversion
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can distort reported forecasts, if subjects have constant relative risk aversion, there
is virtually no diﬀerence in the theoretical distortion that would result under the
two rules. Loss avoidance may be a possible explanation for the diﬀerence in
boundary forecasts, but cannot explain the stochastic dominance finding. Other
possibilities, such as ambiguity aversion and other violations of expected utility
theory are worth pursuing in future research, but are beyond the scope of this
paper.
4. Are elicited forecasts more accurate and/or better calibrated under some scoring
rules than others? Yes. Forecasts from proper scoring rules are more accurate and
better calibrated than forecasts from improper scoring rules.
5. Do individuals in a group update their beliefs in response to the forecasts of other
members of the group?
We found significant forecast revisions in all three scoring rule treatments. The
within group variance of revised forecasts is significantly less than the variance of
initial forecasts. We infer from this that beliefs are converging.
6. Are individual forecasts improved by group interaction? Revised forecasts are more
accurate than initial forecasts, as measured by the MSD, but the magnitude of
improvement is small and statistically insignificant.
The choice of scoring rule to elicit probabilistic beliefs about subjective events can
make a diﬀerence. The distribution of our elicited beliefs under the three scoring rules
are significantly diﬀerent from each other. Our findings add to evidence elsewhere that
the elicitation of beliefs directly from players, simultaneously playing the game for which
they are forecasting outcomes may be unreliable. In light of this, anomalies that have
been cited in the literature about play being inconsistent with beliefs (e.g., Costa-Gomes
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and Weizsacker 2006) are not surprising. The evidence is suﬃciently convincing at this
point, that a reasonable position might be that the use of such procedures yield data
that is at best unreliable and at worst misleading. Our own view is more neutral, and
one hopes that more reliable methods can be discovered. In the meantime, forecasts
elicited directly from players should be interpreted cautiously with the expectation that
they may be distorted in some of the ways identified here.
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